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Kingston.  Edward Elgar, 2010, 256 pp. Hardcover $115.00. 
Reviewed by Kristen Osenga, University of Richmond School of Law. 
kosenga@richmond.edu. 
 
William Kingston frames this book around a clearly stated premise:  the 
focus of information protection regimes has shifted from benefiting the 
public to benefiting private individuals with interests in the game—and this 
shift is not good.  Early on, protection of information was shaped by actors 
with no personal stake but rather a desire to encourage invention and 
innovation for the public good.  These actors were primarily limited by 
constitutional provisions and bureaucratic inefficiencies.  As time went on, 
and as information became a more important commodity, information 
protection schemes were fashioned, or perhaps twisted, by the parties that 
would derive the most benefit.  Stakeholder driven systems are unlikely to 
be able and willing to adapt to changing technology and innovation.  The 
transition from public interests to individual interests, Kingston claims, has 
resulted in a “dysfunctional system” in need of “rescue” (p.125).  Public 
good must be the heart of any reform to information protection, and 
Kingston concludes by offering a set of proposals to that end (pp.136-37). 
The book proceeds in two parts:  First, the book explains the transition of 
information protection regimes from focusing on protecting the public 
interest to benefiting private interests. Second, the book presents a number 
of reforms that would return the balance of information protection to the 
public good (p.vii).  He treats the first goal in roughly the first half of the 
book.  Perhaps because of my familiarity with intellectual property, law, 
and information protection, I found the first half of the book to be less 
relevant.  One intended audience for the book, as stated on its back cover, 
includes “students of IP and innovation [and] patent agents and attorneys.”  
I imagine these groups would react much as I did to the first half of the 
book.  To be fair, throughout this first half, there are a number of interesting 
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historical nuggets buried, even where the topic being described was old hat.  
Another intended audience, “economic policy-makers,” may find the first 
half of the book somewhat more practical, particularly as Kingston weaves 
economic literature and commercial data throughout his discussion of the 
evolution of information protection.  The second half of the book, where 
Kingston sets forth his proposals for improving protection of information, 
will likely be more appealing for all types of readers.  In the context of 
reform proposals, the author shares his wide-ranging knowledge of 
protection regimes in multiple jurisdictions, as well as how protection 
particularly affects different technology areas such as software or genes, to 
provide a solid base on which to understand and evaluate his proposals.  
Although the latter half of the book was much more attention-grabbing from 
my perspective, there are note-worthy portions throughout this book for 
most every reader. 
A quick review of the topics of this book may help elucidate what any 
particular individual reader would find interesting.  Of course, a book 
discussing information rights must necessarily begin by defining what is 
meant by “information” and protection thereof.  In an interesting chapter 
that traverses from Bell’s telephone to Mozart to Murano glass makers in 
Venice, Kingston presents a comprehensive conception of information 
rights by integrating mathematical and biological models of information 
with commons theory and economic thought. 
The next three chapters discuss the historical and current state of 
information rights.  Kingston starts off, not addressing intellectual property 
regimes, but discussing how other means of protecting information may be 
more effective  (p.17).  Again he incorporates historical points of interest, 
using the story of Boulton and Watt’s steam engines to demonstrate how 
information is initially valuable only to those with the capability to make 
use of it, providing a basic advantage to the originator even in the absence 
of protection regimes.  The introduction of corporate structures, such as 
limited liability partnerships and corporations, allowed originators to pair 
with investors to exploit capability (pp.21-25).  After capability, Kingston 
contends that marketing is the second most important means of protection.  
He then covers the basics of trademark law and how it too provides the 
originator of information with market power.  The following chapter on 
patent and copyright protection of information is less intriguing, perhaps 
because it covers well-worn territory or because some of the discussion 
stretches to cover subject matter that is not typically considered 
information, such as pharmaceuticals (p.53), music (p.59), and plants 
(p.64).  Kingston wraps up his discussion of existing regimes with a survey 
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of international protection of information under various intellectual property 
conventions and agreements. 
At this point in the text, Kingston approaches the first of his goals: 
discussing how information rights evolved from a system for public good to 
a system driven by interested parties.  Although information protection 
regimes started with the best intentions, a number of limitations prevented 
these regimes from keeping pace with the evolution of technology.  One 
reason that American law is particularly ill-suited to protect information 
rights is a “particularly strong tether to the past” and a Constitution that 
prohibits forward-looking law (p.85). The Constitution is used to explain 
why the growth of federal trademark law was hampered; why bodies that 
could react quicker to technology change, such as state legislatures, are 
prohibited from doing so; and even why patent office procedures are less 
than effective.  Kingston also considers how bureaucratic influences, such 
as lobbying, led to the shift of information protection for the public good to 
the protection of private interests. 
While the reasoning behind the shift, i.e., that legal development was 
occurring at a much slower pace than technological advancement, seems 
fairly straightforward, the assault by these private interests took place on 
many fronts.  Kingston points to activities at the international, national, and 
industry level, all with the intent of shaping the future of information 
protection for the benefit of the actors involved.  Many of the key 
international intellectual property conventions were negotiated with the best 
interests of the United States and Britain in mind (p.101). At the national 
level, countries often enacted intellectual property laws that were not the 
product of careful legislation to protect the states’ interests, but were based 
on proposals offered either overtly or quietly by interested groups.  
Kingston offers as examples the 1952 United States Patent Act, written by 
patent attorneys but passed by a Congress that did not know what it 
contained or meant (p.102) and the Japanese patent system, which facially 
fulfilled the country’s obligations under international intellectual property 
treaties but worked to the benefit of Japanese conglomerates (pp.106-108).  
Other groups also took advantage of their size and power to focus 
information protection benefits on themselves, including alliances like the 
European Union and industry organizations like the Union of Industrial and 
Employers’ Confederations of Europe, (UNICE), the tobacco industry, and 
the American music and movie groups, including the Recording Industry 
Association of America (RIAA) and the Motion Picture Association of 
America (MPAA).   
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Because the existing regimes were not adapted to today’s technology, 
including software, biotechnology, genetic inventions, and business 
methods, the interested parties have forced current systems to accommodate 
these and other advancements as they saw fit.  At the end of the day, we 
have been left with a patent system that is “in crisis,” a copyright system 
that is protecting software in a way that is “bad logic and bad law,” and 
international protection schemes that are simply “imperialistic, outdated, 
and overprotective” (pp.127-28).  Of course, as Kingston acknowledges, 
others have made similar observations and suggested various routes to 
improvement, such as prizes, second-tier patent protection, and 
compensatory liability. 
With this as a background, Kingston sets out a number of proposals to 
improve the protection of information.  He contends that his ideas can be 
put into effect without revamping the system (pp.146-47).  These 
suggestions are as wide ranging as the problems he seeks to repair, such as 
setting out compulsory arbitration, changing the contours of information 
protection, focusing protection on small and medium enterprises (SMEs), 
and considering sui generis protection of information.  Perhaps because of 
this broad scope of proposals he takes on, I feel that some of the proposals 
could use additional consideration and support. 
Kingston begins with those proposals that would require less difficulty in 
implementation.  The easiest to implement, according to the author, would 
be to require arbitration for dispute resolution.  Because this proposal does 
not run afoul of TRIPS so long as an appeal is possible and because only a 
provision of national treatment would be required to make the proposal 
compliant with the Paris Convention, he contends that this solution is well 
within reach.  In fact, Kingston states that there should not be any difficulty 
in introducing compulsory arbitration in the United States, although there 
may be some issues with implementing arbitration in the European Union 
(pp.159-160).  Aside from being easy to implement, Kingston states that 
arbitration is a less expensive option than litigation, which is useful 
particularly for information because of the fuzzy boundaries of these rights.  
Also arbitration is becoming more and more popular in various technical 
industries because of the ability to have an expert arbitrate technical 
disputes.  Kingston points to the interference proceedings in the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office, as well as the British Patent Office 
opinions procedure, as being potential models when creating the arbitration 
system.  Although I question whether the implementation of such a system 
would be as simple as Kingston contends, I agree that this would certainly 
allow for smaller entities, which may not be able to afford litigation, to be 
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able to participate in shaping information protection, weakening the 
opportunity for large firms to solely control the shape of the laws. 
Kingston next proposes to change the parameters of protection for 
information.  He takes particular issue with the time component of existing 
intellectual property protection—20 years from filing for patent protection, 
50-70 years after the author’s death for copyright protection, and nearly 
indefinite trademark rights.  These time frames simply are not rational 
measures for information.  Kingston instead suggests that money should be 
a better parameter; specifically, protection should last as long as it takes for 
the creator to receive a socially acceptable multiple of the investment he 
made in developing the information.  This multiple should ideally be based 
on the subjectively assessed risk of the endeavor.  The multiple would, of 
course, be difficult to value, but at least a rate that corresponds to the 
amount of investment would lead to more appropriate protection.  The 
multiple would be used as the price to be paid for compulsory licensing of 
the information, and late-comers would be able to use the information by 
sharing in the investment made by the originator.  As further enticement, 
Kingston also proposes that the compulsory licenses be imposed as a one-
time payment, rather than as a royalty.  The originator then has a more 
secure source of recoupment of his risk and the late-comer would have 
greater incentive to make the most use of the licensed information. 
The idea of compulsory licensing based on a multiple is more difficult to 
swallow than the mandatory arbitration proposal.  Kingston acknowledges 
this by providing substantially more support for this suggestion, addressing 
many of the thornier aspects.  Estimating the value of the investment risk, 
and thus the determination of the multiple, is going to be one of the most 
difficult pieces of this proposal.  To this end, Kingston relates how existing 
research programs, such as the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) 
Programs in the United States, have had some success in developing 
numbers of this type.  There is also discussion on how to establish the 
research and development cost basis on which to apply the multiple.  Next, 
he considers the effects of this proposal on a number of information-heavy 
industries, such as university patents on biotechnology, computer software, 
databases, and pharmaceuticals, concluding in each case that adopting this 
proposal is better than any system currently in place.   
Against the most typical argument, that compulsory licensing decreases 
incentives for firms to engage in research and development, Kingston cites 
to “more than 100 antitrust settlements” that involved compulsory licensing, 
none of which, according to Kingston,  had a significant adverse effect on 
research incentives.  Kingston also argues that some of the most widely 
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licensed patents are also the most profitable, such as the Cohen-Boyer gene-
splicing patent (p.165).  On this point, because it is such a regularly raised 
issue and because, by its very nature, compulsory licensing dilutes the 
incentive of exclusive rights, I would have liked to see a more vigorous 
discussion. 
Even were the compulsory licensing system put in place, Kingston notes 
that it would not have the desired effect for smaller firms.  Additional 
changes to any information protection system would need to be made to 
account for these actors.  While Europe and other areas recognize the 
potential of smaller firms, known as small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), these firms have made the most impact in the United States, both 
in terms of their financial success as well as the number of United States 
Patents received by smaller firms from other countries (p.177). But regular 
information protection regimes are failing these firms.  Either their 
inventions do not reach the level required for protection, because they are 
not novel or obvious in the patent field, or they are sufficiently inventive 
but lack seed capital to go forward.  To address these problems, Kingston 
makes a wide range of suggestions.  For example, inexpensive routes to 
protection would be helpful, such as the concessions made by the British 
Patent Office for individuals and SMEs or petty patents.  He also makes 
suggestions for assisting SMEs to enforce their information protection 
rights, including litigation insurance.  However, as he explains, a feasibility 
study of patent insurance was performed at the behest of the European 
Union and the results were not favorable.  Indeed, the study determined that 
there would need to be compulsory participation for the system not to fail 
(p.186).   
Another proposal that has been better received provides for a period of 
incontestability for SMEs’ intellectual property, not unlike the 
incontestability provision of the United States Orphan Drug Act of 1983.  In 
addition to avoiding the threat of litigation early in the life of the patent, the 
incontestability provision would also make these inventions more attractive 
to investors, thereby negating some of the negative effects of information 
protection that apply particularly to SMEs.  As part of implementing an 
incontestability period, Kingston points to Open Review, a process similar 
to the Peer-to-Patent pilot study occurring in the United States. 
The last proposal that Kingston makes is also the most challenging for 
implementation.  One way to overcome the disadvantages of the existing 
intellectual property regimes as applied to information is to protect 
information directly as information (DPI).  The author was the creator of 
one of two DPI proposals studied by the European Union.1  Kingston’s 
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proposed “Innovation Warrant,”2 the subject of this chapter, is not 
surprisingly the one regime change in the book that is well explained and 
well supported.  It is also the proposal that he indicates is the “best 
candidate” (p.236). 
Kingston lays out the case for and the basics of DPI. The focus is not the 
information itself, but the investment required to make the information into 
something useful.  For example, the question about whether the information 
is sufficiently novel becomes: “Is the subject-matter of the application for 
protection available now in the ordinary course of trade?”  If the answer is 
“no”, what is protected is the investment required to change the answer to 
“yes” (p.210).  In order for the DPI to address some of the problems 
associated with traditional information protection schemes, it is important 
for the protection granted to reflect the risk taken in making the investment.  
The first prong that Kingston poses is that the state should both grant the 
protection and enforce what it grants.  The second prong is how risk should 
be determined.  Kingston illustrates this with a matrix relating type of 
innovation (low, medium, and high) to type of risk (incremental, tech-
transfer, and radical) resulting in some number of years of protection 
(p.215). Although the terms listed in the matrix are generally shorter than 
patent protection, DPI would be preferable because of the period of 
incontestability and because it would be the state’s duty to enforce.  
Kingston discusses in detail the workings of the system, including the 
application and enforcement processes.  Included in these processes are 
elements of opposition proceedings and compulsory licensing, as well as the 
opinion practice used in the British Patent Office.  Some of the other key 
features of the DPI system include protection of expectations, because there 
are categories of risk, calculated in the abstract and not subject to discretion; 
reliance on third-party expertise; and flexibility to adapt to new 
technologies or even to allow for different treatment of particular 
technologies. 
In Kingston’s epilogue, however, he concludes that implementing this 
system in the countries most likely to influence international information 
protection will be quite difficult.  The DPI proposal is unlikely to fall within 
the intellectual property clause of the Constitution and the Department of 
Commerce will not want to set up, under the Commerce clause, a system 
that overlaps so much with the patent system that they already oversee.  
Europe, too, is an unlikely candidate because the European Union has long 
worked on a universal patent for its members and has situated its 
intellectual property matters in Brussels (frustrating the DPI provision of 
enforcement by state).  By considering DPI not as intellectual property, but 
as economic policy, it is possible that European Union members could 
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introduce the system nationally, although single implementations may not 
give as much bang for the buck.  Kingston suggests that Canada or 
Australia may be better suited, but these countries have concerns about 
international intellectual property that would make their adoption of DPI 
improbable. 
As is often the case when trying to convey an extraordinary amount of 
information, not to mention describing and justifying a broad range of 
proposals, it is likely impossible to make all readers happy with what has 
been included and what has not.  There were areas I wish that the author had 
covered more concisely or not at all and areas that I would have liked to 
have seen more analysis and detail.  That being said, this book provides a 
broad, if occasionally superficial, panorama of the current and potential 
future landscape of information protection. 
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